Does Class Action Have a Deterrent Effect? by Engel, C.W. (Christoph)
D
el
iv
er
ed
 b
y 
In
ge
nt
a
? 
15
4.
59
.1
24
.3
8 
W
ed
, 3
1 
O
ct
 2
01
8 
14
:0
6:
04
Co
py
rig
ht
 M
oh
r S
ie
be
ck
104
Does Class Action Have a Deterrent Effect?
Comment
by
Christoph Engel∗
Data are the oil that fuels the empirical legal movement. The paper by Klement and
Weinshall-Margel (2016) comes with a full barrel of this oil. The paper is based
on a complete data set of all class action suits that have ever been filed since Israel
introduced class action in 2006. The data were hand-coded by third- and fourth-year
law students under the supervision of trained lawyers, and come with a rich set
of potential explanatory variables. Just describing the data provides legal academia
with valuable insights. To list only two: the new procedural tool is almost exclusively
used for consumer complaints and complaints against government; the attorney and
the representative plaintiff on average even make money if the case is dismissed.
In this note I try to push the analysis one step further and use the data for finding
causal evidence on a claim that has been prominent in the political debate on class
action. In a landmark ruling, Judge Posner dismissed the decision of a district court
to grant class action certification for a hemophiliac who had contracted AIDS from
a contaminated blood transfusion. The main argument was: class action certification
gives plaintiff excessive leverage for obtaining a “blackmail settlement” (In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., U.S. Court of Appeals 7th Circuit, No. 94-3912, decided
March 16, 1995). This argument presupposes that the availability of class action
increases the probability that the case will ultimately go to court; otherwise the
threat would be empty. But is this a sound assumption? If true, countries that allow
for class action would make it more difficult for a would-be tortfeasor to get away
with violating an entire class.
For showing whether class action indeed deters socially undesirable behavior,
one would need data from a control group where sufficiently comparable behavior
is possible, but class action is not available. To make sure that a potential deterrent
effect is indeed caused by class action, the difference between the two groups should
ideally be random. Such data are not available for Israel. But as I hope to show in
the following pages, the existing data are rich enough to test whether, at least, class
action has the deterrent effect that was at the core of Judge Posner’s argument: when
the risk of class action is real, a conflict is more likely to go to court.
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I am most grateful to Alon Klement and Keren Weinshall-Margel for sharing their
data with me to put this claim to the test.
The identification of causal effects requires random variation. I work with the
identifying assumption that the size of the class and the size of the claim for the
representative plaintiff are exogenous. Both depend on the substance of the conflict
and can arguably not be manipulated by the parties. This variation is helpful in
that the product of the two indicators is a measure for the economic value of the
case. The value of the case may serve as a proxy for the risk that a case will be
tried if it is positively correlated with the attorney’s and the representative plaintiff’s
expected profit. This is not obvious, since the courts have discretion in defining both
profits (for detail see Klement and Weinshall-Margel, 2016). Yet empirically this
correlation is indeed observed (Table 1).
Table 1
Manipulation Check
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Dependent variable Attorney fee Payment to class representative
Case value 0.0000512∗∗∗ 0.0000108∗∗∗
(0.00000493) (0.00000056)
ln(case value) 15845.46∗ 4557.74∗∗
(6326.308) (1577.925)
Cons 64890.88∗∗∗ −187092.30+ 19867.45∗∗∗ −53174.36∗
(9584.883) (99187.57) (3153.087) (23899.70)
n 258 258 256 256
p model < 0.0001 0.0129 < 0.0001 0.0042
Notes: OLS; case value: # of members of the class × size of the individual claim; ∗∗∗ p <
0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, + p < 0.1.
Ex ante the outcome of a court case is hardly ever certain. Legal doctrine is
ambiguous, and the facts are frequently disputed. It is difficult to predict beforehand
whether plaintiff will be able to prove her case to the requisite standard. On the other
hand, plaintiffs are not clueless about the odds of winning. If the availability of class
action exerts a deterrent effect, where class action is available more marginal cases
should go to court. In this hypothesis, marginal means that the odds of winning are
less favorable for plaintiff. This is where I can exploit the exogenous variation in
case value. It implies that marginal cases are the more likely to go to court the higher
the case value. If true, plaintiff should be the more likely to lose a class action suit
the higher the case value. This prediction follows from the fact that attorneys and
representative plaintiffs have the more to gain from bringing a class action suit the
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higher the value of the case. In expectation, the risk of bringing a less obvious case
is worth taking.
As Klement and Weinshall-Margel (2016) explain, actual court rulings are rare
in class action. Yet the fact that the case is settled, rather than dropped, is a good
proxy for success. For the typical defendant would rather settle a case that looks
promising than accept the additional cost and risk involved in trying the case.
There are two technical challenges for the estimation, though. One does not find
a significant effect when explaining settlement with the actual case value. As the
figure shows, this variable suffers from an obvious outlier problem. This is why I
work with the log transform; it is almost perfectly normally distributed. As Klement
and Weinshall-Margel (2016) explain, the composition of case types is very uneven.
Different judges have also dealt with very differently many class action suits. Both
observations call for fixed effects. Yet cases brought before several judges, and some
infrequent case types for that matter, have never settled. Were I to estimate with
logit the effect of case value on the probability that the case settles, I would lose
those data points, since these fixed effects perfectly predict failure. This is why I
estimate linear probability models.
Figure
Distribution of Case Values
The regressions in Table 2 show that, indeed, the arguably exogenous case value
has a negative effect on the probability that the case settles. Without controls,
the effect is still insignificant (model 1). But the picture progressively clears with
adding judge fixed effects (model 2), adding case-type fixed effects (model 3),
and controlling for the time trend (model 4). The latter is important because, as
Klement and Weinshall-Margel (2016) show, the number of class action suits has
been increasing rapidly over time.
This comment has been deliberately complementary to the very useful main paper.
It tries to show that, even when convincing data on control groups are not available,
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Table 2
Effect of Case Value on Success Probability
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
ln(case value) −0.005 −0.013∗ −0.016∗∗ −0.019∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Judge fixed effects yes yes yes
Case-type fixed effects yes yes
Date −0.0001921∗∗∗
(0.0000481)
Cons 0.250∗∗ 0.190∗ 0.245∗∗ 0.546∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.086) (0.086) (0.115)
n 705 688 687 687
Notes: OLS (linear probability model); dependent variable: dummy that is 1 if the case is
settled; date: day when case was filed, expressed as day count that starts with earliest case
in data set; ∗∗∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05, + p < 0.1.
this comprehensive data set of all class action suits that have ever been brought in
Israel lends itself to causal analysis, and to additional contributions to the scholarly
and to the policy debate. Most likely, many more applications are still to be made
with these data.
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